Graham v. Florida: Justice Kennedy’s Vision of Childhood and the Role of Judges by Birckhead, Tamar R.
DO NOT DELETE 10/28/2010 3:07:46 PM 
 
 
GRAHAM V. FLORIDA:  
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JUDGES 
TAMAR R. BIRCKHEAD* 
This short essay examines Graham v. Florida, the United States 
Supreme Court decision holding that the Eighth Amendment’s 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not permit a juvenile 
offender to be sentenced to life in prison without parole for a 
nonhomicide crime. This essay argues that Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s majority opinion is grounded not only in Roper v. 
Simmons, which invalidated the death penalty for juvenile offenders 
on Eighth Amendment grounds, and Kennedy v. Louisiana, which 
held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the death penalty for 
the offense of rape of a child, but also in Establishment Clause cases 
set in the context of public schools and Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause cases upholding parental notification requirements 
for teenagers seeking abortions. Whereas many journalists and 
scholars consider Justice Kennedy a “legal pragmatist” who lacks an 
overarching philosophy to guide his decisionmaking, in each of 
these opinions his view of childhood and the proper role of judges is 
consistent: children and adolescents are unformed works in 
progress, in the midst of both character and brain development, who 
are particularly susceptible to direct as well as indirect forms of 
coercion. As a result, according to Justice Kennedy, when 
determining what liberty interests are protected by the United States 
Constitution, the role of judges and the courts is to ensure that youth 
mitigates rather than aggravates. Further, although juvenile justice 
advocates have heralded Graham as a clear victory, the opinion may 
raise as many questions as it seeks to answer. 
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(tbirckhe@email.unc.edu). I am particularly grateful for the comments of Sara Sun Beale, 
Barbara Fedders, Eric Muller, and Gene Nichol during and subsequent to a discussion of 
Graham v. Florida at the UNC Summer Workshop Series, as they helped crystallize my views of 
the case. Of course, the arguments advanced therein and all errors and omissions are my own. 
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On May 17, 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided the 
case of Graham v. Florida,1 holding that the Eighth Amendment’s 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not permit offenders 
convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed as minors to be 
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (JLWOP).2 
Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy applied a form of 
Eighth Amendment comparative analysis that previously had been 
reserved only for capital cases to conclude that evolving standards of 
decency no longer support this type of sentence for this category of 
offenders.3 Justice Kennedy contended that because “a sentencing 
practice itself” (i.e., JLWOP) was in question, the appropriate analysis 
was found in death penalty cases that exempted entire classes of 
offenders who had committed a range of crimes, rather than term-of-
years cases that analyzed whether the gravity of a specific crime 
justified the severity of an individual sentence.4 Without explicitly 
acknowledging the Court’s apparent departure from its long-standing 
“death is different” jurisprudence,5 Justice Kennedy followed the 
approach of cases that prohibited the execution of the mentally 
retarded, juveniles, and those convicted of child rape.6 In so doing, he 
 
 1. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 2034. “JLWOP” refers to sentences of life without the possibility of parole for 
offenses committed by “juveniles” or youth under the age of eighteen. 
 3. Id. at 2021–23. 
 4. Id. at 2022–23; cf. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (finding no Eighth 
Amendment violation for a twenty-five-years-to-life sentence under a state recidivist statute for 
a defendant who had stolen several golf clubs); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) 
(finding no Eighth Amendment violation for a life-without-parole sentence imposed upon a first 
offender possessing a large quantity of cocaine). 
 5. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022–23 (discussing the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence); see 
also id. at 2038–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“Treating juvenile life sentences 
as analogous to capital punishment is at odds with our longstanding view that ‘the death penalty 
is different from other punishments in kind rather than degree’.”); id. at 2045 n.1 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“The Court radically departs from the framework those precedents establish by 
applying to a noncapital sentence the categorical proportionality review its prior decisions have 
reserved for death penalty cases alone . . . . Today’s decision eviscerates that distinction. ‘Death 
is different’ no longer.”). Cf. William W. Berry III, More Different than Life, Less Different than 
Death, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (arguing that Graham did not abandon “death is 
different” jurisprudence but was instead premised on the view that JLWOP is similar to the 
death penalty and different than other forms of noncapital punishment); Robert Smith & G. 
Ben Cohen, Commentary, Redemption Song: Graham v. Florida and the Evolving Eighth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 86, 90–91 (2010) (arguing 
that the distinction between categorical challenges to a sentencing practice and challenges to an 
individual sentence is “more semantic than substantive”). 
 6. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) and Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, opinion modified on 
denial of reh’g, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008)). 
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found that a national consensus against JLWOP existed;7 that 
penological theory, whether premised upon retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, or rehabilitation, failed to provide adequate 
justification for JLWOP;8 and that a new categorical rule was 
necessary, given the insufficiency of the alternatives for addressing the 
constitutional concerns raised by the imposition of JLWOP.9 Justice 
Kennedy also relied upon what he characterized as a “global 
consensus” against the practice, demonstrated by the sentencing laws 
and practices of the international community vis-à-vis juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders.10 Although some critics of the opinion 
consider it yet another example of Justice Kennedy’s idiosyncratic 
approach to decisionmaking,11 an examination of his nomination 
testimony as well as his earlier opinions addressing the rights of 
minors suggests otherwise.   
I. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY 
The underpinnings of the jurisprudential approach and philosophy 
espoused in Graham are found in the testimony given by Justice 
Kennedy during his United States Supreme Court nomination 
hearings in 1987.12 When asked what standards a judge should follow 
in determining whether government action has violated an 
individual’s right to human dignity, Justice Kennedy explained that he 
considers whether the action results in “the inability of the person to 
manifest his or her own personality, the inability of a person to obtain 
his or her own self-fulfillment, [or] the inability of a person to reach 
his or her own potential.”13 Echoes of this sentiment are found in his 
 
 7. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27. 
 8. Id. at 2028–30 (finding that minors are not as morally culpable or susceptible to 
deterrence as adults; that because incorrigibility cannot be accurately determined, juvenile 
offenders should not be incapacitated for life; and that because many prison policies deny those 
without the possibility of parole access to programs, counseling, and treatment, rehabilitation is 
not a viable justification for JLWOP). 
 9. Id. at 2030. 
 10. Id. at 2033. 
 11. See, e.g., Chris Cassidy, Court Sides with Kids Sentenced to Life in Epic Battle over Our 
Constitutional Rights, SLATE, May 19, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-cassidy/court-
sides-with-kids-sen_b_581880.html (describing Justice Kennedy’s approach to judicial decision-
making as “fickle,” with the Graham opinion serving as the most recent example); see also infra 
note 53 and accompanying text. 
 12. Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
U.S.: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 180 (1987) (statement of Judge 
Anthony M. Kennedy). 
 13. Id. 
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subsequent opinions explicating his substantive due process views,14 
his notion of the independent role of judges,15 and his belief in the 
potential for young offenders to be redeemed.16 
One of the rationales for Graham’s holding, for example, was 
premised on the negative impact of a juvenile defendant’s youth on 
the attorney–client relationship.17 Justice Kennedy recognized that 
because juveniles mistrust authority figures and have a limited 
understanding of the criminal justice system, they are less likely than 
adult defendants to work effectively with their lawyers, and as a result 
are at a distinct disadvantage in criminal proceedings.18 He found that 
a case-by-case analysis of whether to impose JLWOP failed to take 
into account the “developmental incompetence” of youth19 or the 
unique challenges faced by attorneys representing juveniles.20 He 
contended that because many minors, like mentally incapacitated 
defendants,21 cannot meaningfully assist counsel, the quality of their 
 
 14. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“At the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of 
the mystery of human life.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty presumes 
an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate 
conduct.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563–64 (2005) (“We then must determine, in 
the exercise of our own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate 
punishment for juveniles.”). 
 16. See, e.g., id. at 573–74 (“When a juvenile offender commits a heinous crime, the State 
can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life 
and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity.”). 
 17. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. 
 18. Id. See also Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling 
Theory and the Role of Child’s Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 
272–73 (2005) (stating that children generally do not work with attorneys as well as adults 
because of their developing cognitive skills, emphasis on short-term consequences, and lack of 
understanding of the attorney-client relationship). 
 19. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. See also Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, 
Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 
828–31 (2005) (discussing the unique features of developmental or adjudicative incompetence, 
in which immaturity-based impairments can render a young offender unable to understand the 
charges against him, the nature of the proceedings, or to assist his attorney in his defense). 
 20. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. See generally Tamar R. Birckhead, Culture Clash: The 
Challenge of Lawyering Across Difference in Juvenile Court, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 959 (2010) 
(discussing the cultural and systemic challenges faced by attorneys representing juveniles). 
 21. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 962 (2007) (granting habeas relief and 
remanding case based on prisoner’s claim that he was denied meaningful opportunity to be 
heard on question of competence to be executed); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) 
(“Mentally retarded defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their 
counsel.”); see also Dan Markel, May Minors be Retributively Punished After Panetti (and 
Graham)?, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. (forthcoming 2010) (arguing that minors, like the presently 
incompetent, are not fit objects for the state’s blaming practices associated with retributive 
punishment). 
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representation is likely to be compromised on a categorical level. 
Therefore, Justice Kennedy concluded, JLWOP as a sentencing 
practice should be barred for nonhomicide offenses.22 In this way, 
Graham reestablished Justice Kennedy’s commitment to ensuring 
that the court system takes an appropriate account of a juvenile’s 
youth, thereby giving young offenders some “hope of restoration.”23 
Justice Kennedy’s nomination testimony also addressed his 
approach to constitutional interpretation, in which he rejected the 
doctrine of original intent.24 He instead contended that although it is 
“highly relevant what the framers thought . . . theirs is not the entire 
body of contemporary opinion and contemporary expression that we 
look to.”25 This view presaged his reliance in Graham on extrajudicial 
sources. For instance, to support his view that young offenders are 
incomplete works in progress for whom redemption remains a viable 
possibility, Justice Kennedy cited social science research on 
adolescent behavior as well as neuro-scientific data on brain 
development.26 He also relied on the laws of other nations, the vast 
majority of which bar JLWOP in all circumstances, in contrast to the 
United States, the only country to impose it for nonhomicide crimes.27 
II. ROPER V. SIMMONS 
In addition to Justice Kennedy’s nomination testimony, critical 
motivating factors for the Graham decision are reflected in the 
language and holding of Roper v. Simmons,28 in which Justice 
Kennedy—again writing for the majority—held that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibited capital punishment for offenders who were 
minors when they committed their crimes.29 The parallels between the 
two opinions’ rationales are striking. In Simmons, Justice Kennedy 
was unwilling to tolerate the risk that jurors would objectify violent 
juvenile offenders, judge them through the lens of stereotype and bias, 
 
 22. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. 
 23. Id. at 2027. 
 24. Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 180 at 150 (1987) (testimony of 
Judge Anthony M. Kennedy). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. 
 27. Id. at 2033–34 (finding that only eleven countries allow JLWOP and that the U.S. is the 
only country to impose the punishment for nonhomicides). 
 28. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 29. Id. at 575. 
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and consider their youth as an aggravating rather than a mitigating 
factor in sentencing.30 If, as he contended, psychiatric experts are 
unable to distinguish between adolescents who act out of “transient 
immaturity” and those who commit crimes reflecting “irreparable 
corruption,” jurors cannot reliably be expected to make such 
distinctions.31 Similarly, in Graham, Justice Kennedy was unwilling to 
tolerate the risk that a judge or jury would sentence a minor to 
JLWOP based on a “discretionary, subjective” judgment that the 
youth was incorrigible and could not be redeemed.32 Although he 
conceded that it was “salutary” that some state laws required 
prosecutors to consider age when making charging decisions, he found 
such safeguards inadequate to block a court from imposing JLWOP 
on an offender who was not morally culpable.33 In both opinions 
Justice Kennedy concluded that a case-by-case approach could not 
reliably separate out those juveniles with the capacity for change; only 
a categorical rule that drew a bright line between childhood and 
adulthood was sufficient to avoid the imposition of punishment 
disproportionate to the crime.34 
The facts underlying Simmons and Graham vividly illustrate these 
principles. In Simmons, which involved the violent murder of a 
woman by seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons and a younger 
boy, the prosecutor pointedly argued during the penalty phase of the 
trial that the jury should consider Simmons’ youth as an aggravating 
factor when determining whether a death sentence was appropriate: 
“Think about age. Seventeen years old. Isn’t that scary? Doesn’t that 
scare you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the 
contrary.”35 In Graham the sentencing judge explicitly concluded that 
seventeen-year-old Terrance Jamar Graham, who had prior armed 
burglary charges and was alleged to have committed subsequent 
robberies, was unalterably depraved: “[Y]ou decided that this is how 
you were going to lead your life and that there is nothing that we can 
do for you . . . . [W]e can’t help you any further. We can’t do anything 
 
 30. Id. at 572–73. See Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogating Juveniles 
After Roper v. Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 390–91 (2008) (discussing the bases for 
Justice Kennedy’s decision in Simmons). 
 31. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 573. 
 32. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031. 
 33. Id. at 2030–31 (discussing the laws of Florida, the jurisdiction in which the juvenile, 
Graham, was sentenced). 
 34. Id. at 2031–32; Simmons, 543 U.S. at 573–74. 
 35. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 558. 
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to deter you.”36 In both opinions Justice Kennedy asserted that the 
graphic brutality of the crimes and the seeming incorrigibility of the 
offenders increased the risk that the fact-finder would be unable to 
appreciate the significance of the defendant’s youth at sentencing.37 
A further similarity between Simmons and Graham is the 
majority’s contention in each case that the holding was narrow and 
circumscribed. Upon acknowledging in Simmons that the death 
penalty might have some deterrent effect, Justice Kennedy 
emphasized that JLWOP remained a viable punishment that was itself 
“a severe sanction, in particular for a young person.”38 Five years later 
he highlighted in Graham that although JLWOP was now barred for 
nonhomicide offenses, the state was not “required” to release a 
juvenile offender during his natural life and, thus, the possibility that 
these defendants would remain imprisoned had not been foreclosed.39 
Justice Kennedy underscored that Graham forbade states only from 
deciding “at the outset” that young offenders were intrinsically 
incapable of redemption and would never be fit to reenter society.40 
However, the fact that Graham’s reasoning relied so heavily upon 
Simmons belies such sentiments,41 giving credence to the view that 
these holdings would inevitably be extended to other contexts.42 
III. KENNEDY V. LOUISIANA 
In addition to Simmons, the reasoning in Graham also relied upon 
the Eighth Amendment case of Kennedy v. Louisiana, which held that 
capital punishment for the offense of rape of a child is cruel and 
 
 36. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031. 
 37. Id. at 2031–32; Simmons, 543 U.S. at 572–73. 
 38. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 572. See also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2039 (Roberts, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (“Indeed, Roper explicitly relied on the possible imposition of life without 
parole on some juvenile offenders.”). 
 39. Id. at 2030 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. at 2022, 2026, 2028 (citing Simmons in support of the Court’s holdings). 
 42. See, e.g., Simmons, 543 U.S. at 621 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“If juries cannot make 
appropriate determinations in cases involving murderers under eighteen, in what other kinds of 
cases will the Court find jurors deficient? . . . Why not take other mitigating factors, such as 
considerations of childhood abuse or poverty, away from juries as well?”); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 
2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“No reliable limiting principle remains to prevent the Court from 
immunizing any class of offenders from the law’s third, fourth, fifth, or fiftieth most severe 
penalties as well.”). See infra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing areas into which 
Graham’s holding could potentially be extended, including challenges to JLWOP sentences for 
homicide as well as homicide-related offenses such as felony-murder). 
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unusual.43 Justice Kennedy revealed his vision of childhood in the 
opinion’s implicit suggestion that severely victimized youth have the 
potential for physical and psychological recovery and that because of 
the unformed nature of their characters, even these children have the 
capacity to change and, thus, to heal.44 This view is analogous to his 
portrayal in Graham of young offenders as “not as well formed” and 
therefore “more capable of change” than adults.45 Kennedy v. 
Louisiana also set out Justice Kennedy’s view of the role of the courts 
with his characterization of child rape as a brutal crime that “in many 
cases will overwhelm a decent person’s judgment,” increasing the risk 
that jurors could not consistently balance aggravating factors against 
mitigating circumstances.46 This view was reiterated in Graham with 
the assertion that judges must exercise “independent judgment” to 
ensure that an adolescent offender’s youth is treated as mitigating and 
not aggravating at sentencing.47 
Justice Kennedy’s arguably paternalistic inclination to deny the 
decisionmaking capacity of youth in the name of protecting them is 
also evinced in both of these cases. In Kennedy v. Louisiana Justice 
Kennedy asserted that due to their inherent immaturity, child victims 
should not undergo the trauma of testifying in a capital sex offense 
case or be implicated by the state’s decision to seek the death 
penalty.48 In Graham Justice Kennedy’s opinion was premised on the 
view that because minors are not as culpable for their actions as 
adults, they are “less deserving of the most severe punishments.”49 He 
further contended in Kennedy that it was not clear that the child 
victim’s “hurt” would be in any way “lessened when the law 
permit[ted] the death of the perpetrator” rather than only life without 
parole or a term-of-years sentence.50 He suggested that a state that 
punishes child rape by death may in fact add to the risk of non- or 
underreporting by children and remove a strong incentive for rapists 
not to kill their victims.51 Similarly, Justice Kennedy asserted in 
Graham that JLWOP sentences prevented young offenders from 
 
 43. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008). 
 44. See id. at 2662–63 (discussing whether imposing the death penalty balances the wrong 
to the victim in child rape and other nonhomicide cases). 
 45. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. 
 46. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2660–61. 
 47. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031–32. 
 48. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2660–61. 
 49. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27. 
 50. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2662. 
 51. Id. at 2663–64. 
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accessing vocational training and rehabilitative services while 
incarcerated, thereby categorically denying them the possibility of 
redemption—a disproportionate punishment for juveniles who did 
not commit homicide.52  
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT AND DUE PROCESS CASES 
Despite critics’ claims that Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudential 
approach lacks integrity,53 the Graham decision is also consistent with 
his opinions addressing the rights of youth outside the context of 
Eighth Amendment analysis. For instance, in writing for the majority 
in the Establishment Clause case of Lee v. Weisman,54 Justice Kennedy 
considered the matter from the perspective of the fourteen-year-old 
when holding that the inclusion of invocation and benediction by a 
member of the clergy at a public middle school graduation violated 
the student’s rights under the First Amendment.55 Recognizing that 
adolescents are often under pressure from peers to conform and that 
implicit pressure to stand or maintain respectful silence may be subtle 
but is “as real as any overt compulsion,” Justice Kennedy held that 
prayer exercises in public schools carry “a particular risk of indirect 
coercion.”56 In holding that school prayer may appear to the dissenter 
or nonbeliever as an attempt “to employ the machinery of the State to 
enforce a religious orthodoxy,”57 Justice Kennedy credited “the real 
conflict of conscience faced by the young student” and asserted that 
“[o]ur society would be less than true to its heritage if it lacked 
abiding concern for the values of its young people.”58 
 
 52. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029–30. 
 53. See, e.g., FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND 
NECESSARY MEANING OF LIBERTY 1–2 (2009) (referencing the “general consensus” that 
Justice Kennedy lacks “a consistent approach to constitutional interpretation”); THOMAS R. 
HENSLEY ET AL., THE CHANGING SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND 
LIBERTIES 75 (1997) (stating that Justice Kennedy “does not appear to have a consistent judicial 
philosophy to guide his decision making”); TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 17, 36 (2000) (describing Justice Kennedy as “a legal pragmatist” who 
“refused to commit himself to a single, overarching theory of interpretation”); Robert Nagel, 
Liberals and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 319, 323 (1992) (stating that Justice Kennedy’s 
nomination testimony suggested “to say the least, an undeveloped, mushy legal philosophy”). 
 54. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 55. Id. at 592–93. 
 56. Id. at 592–94. 
 57. Id. at 592. 
 58. Id. at 596, 598. Justice Kennedy’s adherence to this principle of government coercion 
was latent in earlier Establishment Clause cases in which he found no evidence that the state had 
taken steps to advance one religion over another. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. 
v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 260–61 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
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Likewise, in the context of the Due Process Clause, Justice 
Kennedy voted to uphold state statutes requiring parental notification 
for teenagers seeking abortions. He acknowledged that although his 
ideal of the compassionate and mature parent may not exist in every 
instance, to assume otherwise would be to “deny all dignity to the 
family.”59 In finding such laws constitutionally valid even without 
judicial bypass provisions, Justice Kennedy focused on the apparent 
needs of children in asserting that the exclusion of parents from the 
decisionmaking process “is to risk, or perpetuate, estrangement or 
alienation from the child when she is in the greatest need of parental 
guidance and support.”60 
These opinions reflect and expand upon Justice Kennedy’s vision 
of childhood and his view of the judicial role. Each reiterates his 
belief that in cases concerning children and adolescents, courts must 
show heightened sensitivity regardless of the context, and judges must 
use their independent judgment to ensure that vital liberty interests—
both of the youth and the family unit—are protected. In Justice 
Kennedy’s view, whether young people are pressured to conform to a 
specific religious practice,61 left to decide whether to have an  
 
abortion,62 or sentenced as adults for serious felonies,63 their youth 
 
judgment) (finding that a federal statute did not violate the Establishment Clause by allowing 
religious clubs to meet on school premises where there was no government coercion); Cnty. of 
Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 664 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the public 
display of a menorah and a crèche was not an instance in which “the government’s power to 
coerce has been used to further the interests of Christianity or Judaism in any way,” as they are 
but passive symbols of religious holidays). 
 59. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990). See Hodgson v. 
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 482–85 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (discussing “the State’s interest in acknowledging and promoting the role of 
parents in the care and upbringing of their children”). 
 60. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 486. But see, e.g., id. at 462–66 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (arguing that the parental notification 
requirement “can have severe physical and psychological effects” on young women and that it is 
“especially devastating for minors who live in fear of physical, psychological, or sexual abuse”); 
Marcia D. Greenberger & Katherine Connor, Parental Notice and Consent for Abortion: Out of 
Step with Family Law Principles and Policies, 23 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 31, 31, 35 (1991) (arguing 
that parental consent and notice laws, such as those upheld in Hodgson, can “cause serious 
harm” by “spark[ing] a family upheaval that otherwise would not occur,” and are “out of step 
with the common state practice of allowing minors themselves to consent to medical services 
relating to sensitive health concerns, particularly those services related to sexual activity”). 
 61. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 592–93. 
 62. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 486. 
 63. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010). 
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must be acknowledged, accommodated, and ultimately protected. 
V. CRITIQUES OF GRAHAM 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Graham drew criticism from both 
ends of the political spectrum. Some juvenile justice advocates and 
scholars argued that by ordering states merely to provide an 
“opportunity” for release, the opinion did not go far enough in 
protecting young offenders from disproportionately punitive 
sentences.64 They asserted that the Court failed to provide guidance or 
objective standards to the states for evaluating a youth’s maturity or 
amenability to treatment.65 As a result, given that the “means and 
mechanisms for compliance” with the Court’s order are within each 
individual state’s discretion, the victory—they contend—is but 
Pyrrhic.66 
The arguments presented in Graham’s dissenting opinions provide 
the opposing view, which reflects themes also expressed by the 
Simmons dissenters. Justice Thomas in Graham and Justice Scalia in 
Simmons both offered classic originalist critiques of Justice Kennedy’s 
view of the role of judges and the courts.67 Premised on a traditional 
reading of American history and an adherence to “centuries-old” 
practice, Justices Thomas and Scalia argued (respectively) that the 
Graham and Simmons majorities had flagrantly imposed their “own 
sense of morality and retributive justice” on state lawmakers and 
voters.68 In Graham Justice Thomas took issue with the substitution of 
the Court’s judgment for that of “our fellow citizens.”69 He argued 
against the necessity of a categorical rule, as the jury process 
“necessarily admits of human error,” as does the “process of judging 
 
 64. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Juvenile Justice Delayed? Rather than Set a Uniform Standard to 
Reduce Harsh Sentences for Minors, the Court in Graham Left Compliance Mechanisms up to 
the States, NAT’L L.J. 38 (June 14, 2010) (“Rather than establishing a firm principle of 
discounted culpability that would cabin harsh sentencing for all minors, Graham instead offers 
eligible juveniles a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity 
and rehabilitation.’ The ‘means and mechanisms for compliance’ are left up to the states.” 
(quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2016)). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See generally Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2043–58 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Simmons, 543 
U.S. at 608–30 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 68. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Simmons, 543 U.S. at 615–16 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 69. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2043 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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in which we engage”;70 and he warned that the decision opened the 
door for a whole host of line-drawing problems.71 In Simmons Justice 
Scalia challenged the majority’s “implausible assertion” that a 
national consensus existed against capital punishment for offenders 
who committed murder before age eighteen.72 He argued that the 
application of a categorical prohibition of the death penalty for all 
minors was arbitrary and unwarranted, as capital cases already 
required individualized consideration of each defendant.73 Justice 
Scalia concluded by rejecting “out of hand” the notion that American 
law “should conform to the laws of the rest of the world.”74 
Although several of these points are valid and have rhetorical 
appeal, perhaps the most provocative dissenting argument expressed 
in both Simmons and Graham challenged the majority’s reliance on 
empirical data from sociological studies to establish that juveniles are 
too impressionable and unformed to warrant either execution or 
JLWOP.75 In Simmons Justice Scalia referenced studies that seemingly 
contradicted the Court’s conclusions, including research relied upon 
in an earlier case by Simmons amici to support the position that 
adolescents have the cognitive ability to make an informed choice to 
terminate a pregnancy.76 In response to Justice Scalia’s claims that the 
amici had “flip-flopped” between the abortion case and Simmons, 
prominent psychologists have asserted that although both cases 
involved adolescent decisionmaking, the legal issues implicated were 
very different, and the research in each case addressed “distinct 
aspects of adolescent behavior and attributes.”77 In Graham Justice 
 
 70. Id. at 2055. 
 71. Id. at 2057. 
 72. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 620. 
 74. Id. at 624. 
 75. Id. at 617 (“[The majority] never explains why those particular studies are 
methodologically sound; none was ever entered into evidence or tested in an adversarial 
proceeding.”); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2054–56 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
“generalizations” from social science are irrelevant to constitutional rulemaking and challenging 
the majority’s interpretation of the data). 
 76. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 617–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing studies relied upon in 
Hodgson v. Minn., 497 U.S. 417 (1990), which upheld parental notification requirements for 
teens seeking abortions). See also supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (discussing Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in Hodgson). 
 77. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults? Minors’ 
Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 583, 585 (2009). See also id. at 593 (urging those who seek “a uniform answer to 
questions about where we should draw the line between adolescence and adulthood for 
different purposes under the law . . . [to] consider the asynchronous nature of psychological 
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Thomas similarly argued that the Court “misstate[d] the 
[psychological] data” and improperly relied upon its own view of 
“morality and social conditions.”78 Justice Kennedy’s failure to 
respond to—or even acknowledge—these critiques is a legitimate 
weakness of both opinions. 
Neither dissent, however, recognized the ways in which its own 
analysis offered merely an alternate value judgment to the one made 
by the majority. A commitment to an interpretation of constitutional 
and statutory text in which the words have fixed meaning—
unchanged since the days of the framers—may be just as subjective a 
choice as Justice Kennedy’s focus on the institutional intent indicated 
by the text.79 Perhaps the strongest objection to the use of originalist 
jurisprudence by Justices Scalia and Thomas is the apparent 
inconsistency with which they apply it, invoking it in cases such as 
Simmons and Graham while “stretch[ing] or even ignor[ing it] 
entirely if it interferes with strongly held policy preferences” (as in 
federal affirmative action, school integration, and gender 
discrimination cases).80 What remains consistent, however, are the 
critiques of the dissenters when confronted with categorical bars to 
specific types of sentences for juveniles; if Graham’s holding is 
ultimately extended to other kinds of offenses or groups of offenders, 
such arguments will likely be reiterated. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
One of the many questions left to address is the legacy of Graham: 
 
maturation, especially during periods of dramatic and rapid change across multiple domains of 
functioning”). 
 78. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2054–56 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 79. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631–32 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, which held that the First Amendment forbids clergy-
led prayer at public school ceremonies, “invents a boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test 
of psychological coercion” that is “bereft of any reference to history” and “lays waste a tradition 
as old as public school graduation ceremonies themselves, and that is a component of an even 
more longstanding American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at public celebrations 
generally.”). See also COLUCCI, supra note 53 at 2–7 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s rejection of 
originalist jurisprudence in favor of a “moral vision of constitutional liberty”). 
 80. See, e.g., Scott Lemieux, Scalia and Thomas: Originalist Sinners, AM. PROSPECT, June 
29, 2007, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=scalia_and_thomas_originalist_sinners 
(discussing the “sporadic commitment” of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas to originalist 
methods). See also Gene R. Nichol, Justice Scalia and the Printz Case: The Trials of an 
Occasional Originalist, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 953, 968–73 (1999) (discussing the inconsistencies 
with which Justice Scalia approaches constitutionalism and his frequent departures from 
originalism). 
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What is the opinion’s significance for Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence? Although the United States Supreme Court has never 
before applied a categorical rule to the noncapital punishment 
context, Graham could provide the basis for challenging JLWOP 
sentences for homicides as well as for homicide-related offenses such 
as felony–murder. Justice Kennedy’s view that an offender’s youth is 
mitigating and not aggravating could be extended to argue that if the 
youth did not kill or have the intent to kill, or is otherwise not death-
eligible, no penological interest is served in allowing for JLWOP. 
Likewise, Graham could ultimately support barring term-of-year 
sentences that are the practical equivalent of JLWOP, such as ones 
that only provide for parole review after thirty- or forty-years’ 
imprisonment. If JLWOP is in essence a sentence mandating that 
young offenders die in prison,81 it may be indistinguishable from 
decades-long incarcerative sentences that do not allow for even the 
possibility of release until the offender is well into middle-age. 
Moreover, now that juveniles have been categorically exempted from 
JLWOP for nonhomicides, courts may be confronted with challenges 
to life without parole sentences from adult defendants who are 
psychologically incapacitated, mentally retarded, or even acutely drug 
addicted. If their transgressions are found to be less morally 
reprehensible than those who are not similarly impaired, the 
argument that they too are unfit objects of the state’s sentencing laws 
may require additional categorical exemptions from certain types of 
punishment. Given that an estimated 2,500 juveniles are serving 
JLWOP in the United States, of whom only 129 have been sentenced 
for nonhomicide crimes,82 the long-term significance of Graham may 
be found in its precedential effect rather than its direct impact.83 
Finally, what of Justice Kennedy’s arguably romantic notions and 
paternalistic rhetoric vis-à-vis children? Will Graham be invoked to 
limit adolescents’ decisionmaking capacity outside the realm of 
criminal court? Can the Justice who most consistently holds the 
 
 81. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010) (No. 08-7621), 2009 
WL 2159656 at *6; Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010) (“Terrance Graham’s [life 
without parole] sentence guarantees he will die in prison without any meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release . . . .”). 
 82. Facts and Opinions on Juvenile Life without Parole, JUV. JUST. UPDATE (Civic 
Research Inst., Kingston, N.J.) June–July 2010, at 9. 
 83. See Marsha Levick, Kids Really Are Different: Looking Past Graham v. Florida, 87 
CRIM. L. REP. 1, 3–4 (July 14, 2010) (stating that Graham “opened the door” to extending its 
ruling to juvenile felony murder cases as well as to juveniles serving lengthy terms-of-years for 
nonhomicides). 
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Supreme Court’s swing vote be persuaded to adopt a more nuanced, 
textured vision of young people, one that exempts them from the 
harshest forms of punishment while also recognizing and respecting 
their autonomy in other contexts? Although speculating as to what 
the Supreme Court will decide next is of less value than reading tea 
leaves, suffice it to say that in future cases implicating the rights of 
children, Justice Kennedy’s vision and philosophy will inevitably 
remain a critical—if not dominant—factor. 
 
